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Soldiers as Victims at the ECCC: Exploring the Concept of 
‘Civilian’ in Crimes against Humanity  
 
Abstract: The inspiration for this article came from a call for amicus curiae briefs issued in 
April 2016 by the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges in the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). The call sought guidance on: whether, under customary 
international law applicable between 1975 and 1979, an attack by a state or organization 
against members of its own armed forces may amount to an attack directed against a civilian 
population for the purpose of constituting a crime against humanity under Article 5 of the 
ECCC Law. We argue that customary international law justifies a finding that an attack on 
members of the armed forces can constitute crimes against humanity. In particular, the article 
focuses on the importance placed on the persecution element of crimes against humanity in the 
post-Second World War jurisprudence, and the broad interpretation of the term ‘civilian’. The 
article also examines the jurisprudence of contemporary international courts, finding that in 
some cases the courts have interpreted the term ‘civilian’ as incorporating hors de combat. 
However, the ICTY and ICC have moved towards a more restrictive interpretation of the term 
‘civilian’, potentially excluding members of the armed forces. We argue that this move is 
regressive, and against the spirit in which the offence of crimes against humanity was created. 
The ECCC has an opportunity to counter this restrictive approach, thereby narrowing the 
protection gap which crimes against humanity were initially created to close. 
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This article considers to what extent an attack against members of the armed forces can be a 
crime against humanity (CAH). It specifically analyses this issue within the context of the 
crimes perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge, a communist regime who held power in Cambodia 
from April 1975 to January 1979, and were responsible for the deaths of an estimated 1.7 
million people.1 For the last decade, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC) has been attempting to hold former Khmer Rouge cadres accountable for their crimes, 
and has thus far found three individuals guilty of CAH, amongst other offences.2 The 
inspiration for this article came from a call for amicus curiae briefs issued in April 2016 by the 
ECCC’s Office of the Co-Investigating Judges (OCIJ), the organ responsible for the 
investigations, identification of crimes and collection of evidence.3 Drafted by the International 
Co-Investigating Judge Michael Bohlander, the call sought guidance on a specific legal 
question: whether, under customary international law applicable between 1975 and 1979, an 
attack by a state or organization against members of its own armed forces may amount to an 
attack directed against a civilian population for the purpose of constituting a crime against 
humanity under Article 5 of the ECCC Law. Under Article 5, CAH are any acts committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, on national, 
political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds. The ECCC has previously found that while a 
‘civilian population’ need not be entirely made up of civilians, members of the armed forces 
are not considered ‘civilians’, even if they are hors de combat.4 
However, as explained by Judge Bohlander in the amicus call: 
                                                          
1 B. Kiernan, ‘The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia’ (2003) 35(4) Critical Asian Studies 585. 
2 Case 001, Appeal Judgement, 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, A. Ch., 3 February 2012; Case 002/01, Trial 
Judgement, 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, T. Ch., 7 August 2014. 
3 Case 003, Call for Submissions by the Parties in Cases 003 and 004 and Call for Amicus Curiae Briefs, 003/07-
09-2009-ECCC-OCIJ, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, 19 April 2016. 
4 Case 001, Trial Judgment, 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC, 26 July 2010, paras 304-305; Case 002/01 Trial 
Judgment, supra note 2, paras183-186. 
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It seems that an argument could be made that…the entire distinction between 
combatants and civilians might only make sense if we are talking about combatants and 
civilians of the enemy population…One could further argue that it would a) seem 
beyond dispute that a regime which in peace times tried to cleanse its own armed forces 
of, for example, all soldiers holding a particular ethnicity or faith, would under 
international customary law be engaging in a variety of crimes against humanity, 
because the victims’ combatant quality merely because they are soldiers would be 
entirely irrelevant in this context, and that b) there is no reason to think otherwise if 
such a campaign happened in the course of or otherwise connected to an armed 
conflict.5 
The factual context to this legal problem is contained within Cases 0036 and 0047 at the ECCC. 
It appears that the legal issue identified by the OCIJ has arisen in the context of attempting to 
prosecute a number of accused for internal purges perpetrated against Khmer Rouge cadres 
during the regime. As noted by the OCIJ, the issue of what effect the presence of soldiers or 
combatants among a target group has on the interpretation of ‘civilian population’ for the 
purposes of identifying a CAH becomes a vital legal issue when regimes target their own 
soldiers. The situation is complicated further by the need to ascertain customary international 
law at the time of the crimes, thus requiring particular consideration of jurisprudence prior to 
1975-1979.  
The authors were involved in the submission of an amicus on this issue. At the request of the 
OCIJ, the submission did not apply its legal findings to the specific context of the ECCC, but 
explored the issue as an abstract question of law. In this article, we wish to put forward some 
                                                          
5 Supra, note 3, para. 5. 
6 ‘Case 003’, ECCC Website, www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/286 (last accessed 07/06/2016). 
7 ‘Case 004’, ECCC Website, www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/98 (last accessed 07/06/2016); ‘Case 004/01’, 
ECCC Website, www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/1662 (last accessed 07/06/2016). 
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thoughts on the possible legal approaches open to the OCIJ, applying our legal analysis to the 
specific factual context. The issue of whether attacks against soldiers and combatants may 
constitute CAH is not only of importance to the ECCC. As noted by the OCIJ, it does not 
appear that any of the other contemporary international criminal tribunals, such as the 
International Tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) and the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), or the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) have specifically addressed this particular question.8 Thus, 
the ECCC has the opportunity to contribute significantly to the development of international 
criminal law. An in-depth analysis of this area of law is therefore particularly timely.  
This article shall proceed as follows. We shall first provide some factual background by 
exploring the phenomenon of internal purges during the Khmer Rouge era and outlining some 
of the crimes allegedly perpetrated by the accused in Cases 003 and 004.  We shall then explore 
the creation of CAH, which emerged as a way of addressing what was later described as the 
‘protection gap’ between genocide and war crimes.9 We then examine the customary 
international law applicable between 1975 and 1979. We argue that the law at this time 
permitted members of the armed forces to be considered civilians for the purposes of CAH, 
and that the OCIJ would be justified in adopting such an approach. We then analyse recent 
developments in contemporary international criminal tribunals. While these developments are 
outside the period under discussion, they may provide guidance, as the language of Article 5 
of the ECCC Statute reflects contemporary formulations of CAH. We argue that while 
international criminal law continues to acknowledge that attacks against members of the armed 
forces may amount to CAH, recent jurisprudence has adopted a restrictive approach which 
goes against the spirit in which the crime was created, and reopens the ‘protection gap’. We 
argue that not only is a less restrictive interpretation justified by our analysis of the law at the 
                                                          
8 Call for Submissions, supra note 3, para. 4. 
9 The Prosecutor v Mrkšić et al, Trial judgment, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, T. Ch. II, 27 September 2007 para. 461. 
5 
 
relevant time, it is also appropriate in light of the spirit in which CAH was created. Thus, the 
OCIJ has the opportunity to both clarify the law, and oppose this restrictive interpretation. 
2. Purges and Persecution under the Khmer Rouge 
The Khmer Rouge purges undoubtedly constituted a significant source of death and suffering 
during the regime.10 Former cadres have spoken of Pol Pot’s plan to address ‘betrayal’ within 
the party,11 and to ‘smash’ those who were seen as ‘impure’.12 The result was a massive wave 
of internal purges that led to the deaths of thousands of cadres.13 The violence accelerated 
throughout the regime, as the Khmer Rouge ‘purged and re-purged itself’.14 It appears that the 
standard purge process was to send trusted cadres into an area and systematically arrest and 
execute local officials,15 while the Khmer Rouge leaders publicly denounced the victims as 
enemies.16 Many were sent to the infamous S-21 security centre, where, of the 14,000 
individuals murdered, it is estimated that more than 1,000 were Khmer Rouge soldiers.17  
In his call for amicus submissions, the International CIJ spoke of ‘a regime which… tried to 
cleanse its own armed forces of, for example, all soldiers holding a particular ethnicity or 
faith.’18 This may be interpreted as a reference to the strong discriminatory nature of many of 
the purges, and to the broader discriminatory policies that the Khmer Rouge directed against 
                                                          
10 For details, see B. Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer 
Rouge, 1975-1979 (2008) Chapter Eight. 
11 R. Moss, ‘Cadre addresses KR purges’ Phnom Penh Post, 23 April 2015. 
12 J. Ciorciari and Y. Chhang, ‘Documenting the Crimes of Democratic Kampuchea’ in J. Ramjo and B. Van 
Schaak (eds.), Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice. Prosecuting Mass Violence Before the Cambodian Courts 
(2005) 221 at 241, 280. 
13 Ibid. 
14 K. D. Jackson (ed.), Cambodia, 1975–1978: Rendezvous with Death (1989) 3; S. Heder and B.D. Tittemore, 
Seven Candidates for Prosecution: Accountability for the Crimes of the Khmer Rouge (2001) 36. 
15 Kiernan, supra note 10, at 244. 
16 S. Heder and B.D. Tittemore, Seven Candidates for Prosecution: Accountability for the Crimes of the Khmer 
Rouge (2001) at 39 citing "Weekly Report of the Sector 5 Committee," May 21, 1977 (DC-Cam document with 
no cataloguing mark visible). 
17 R.J. Fey, Genocide and International Justice (2009) 91.  
18 Call for Submissions, supra note 3, at para. 4. 
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ethnic and religious groups such as the Khmer Krom,19 the Cham Muslims,20 Buddhists21 and 
the ethnic Vietnamese.22 The regime singled these groups out for extermination, as it pursued 
its goal of creating a completely homogenous society.23 It is therefore likely that the CIJ was 
referring to the Khmer Rouge’s violent attempts to purge the Party of members who it deemed 
undesirable because of their ethnic, political or religious background, as well as those who 
demonstrated an alleged lack of ideological commitment.  
The accused in Cases 003 and 004 face a number of charges of CAH,24 and the OCIJ has 
identified purges in Case 004, and crimes perpetrated against members of Khmer Rouge 
Divisions in Case 003, as being part of its investigations.25 Indeed, two of the largest purges 
appear to fall within the scope of Cases 003 and 004.26 In the context of Case 003, it is alleged 
by Heder and Tittemore and others that in April 1975 the accused Meas Muth became secretary 
of a section of Cambodia known as Division 164,27 where he used his authority to bring about 
a purge, executing some, and sending others to the S-21 security centre in Phnom Penh.28 The 
charges against him reflect these allegations, as they include CAH perpetrated at various 
security centres, in a number of worksites, and against members of Divisions 164, 502, 117, 
                                                          
19 Kiernan, supra note 10, at 299. See also J.D. Ciorciari, ‘The Khmer Krom and the Khmer Rouge Trials’ (August 
2008) DC-Cam. 
20 Case 002, Closing Order, 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/, Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, 15 September 2010, 
paras. 1336-1449. 
21 Ibid. at para. 210. 
22 Ciorciari and Chhang, supra note 12, at 247. 
23 J.A. Tyner, The Killing of Cambodia: Geography, Genocide and the Unmaking of Space (2008), 114. 
24 ‘The International Co-Investigating Judge Charges Im Chaem in absentia in Case 004’, ECCC Website, 
www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/international-co-investigating-judge-charges-im-chaem-absentia-case-004; ‘Mr 
Yim Tith charged in Case 004’, ECCC Website, www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/mr-yim-tith-charged-case-004; 
‘The International Co-Investigating Judge charges Ao An in Case 004’, ECCC Website, 
www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/international-co-investigating-judge-charges-ao-case-004; ‘Mr Meas Muth charged 
in Case 003’, ECCC Website, www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/mr-meas-muth-charged-case-003 (all last accessed 
07/06/2016). 
25 Ibid. 
26 R.C. DeFalco, ‘Cases 003 and 004 at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal: The Definition of “Most Responsible” 
Individuals According to International Criminal Law’ (2014) 2(8) Genocide Studies and Prevention: An 
International Journal 45, at 57.  
27 Heder and Tittemore, supra note 16, at 99-113. 
28 ‘Meas Muth, Trial: Profiles’, Trial International, www.trial-ch.org/en/resources/trial-watch/trial-
watch/profiles/profile/4269/action/show/controller/Profile.html (last accessed 02/06/2016). 
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and 310.29 In the context of Case 004, the accused, Ao An, is alleged to have held the position 
of Deputy Secretary of the Central Zone in 1977, where approximately 150,000 people were 
executed.30 He allegedly purged the Zone of those he declared ‘disloyal’ for failing to meet the 
goals set by the regime, arresting and murdering virtually all officials and their families.31 
Amongst the charges against him are allegations of persecution on political and religious 
grounds, including crimes against Khmer Rouge cadres and their families.32 The accused Im 
Chaem allegedly became Secretary of Preah Net Preah district in Banteay Meanchey province 
during the 1977 Khmer Rouge purge of the Northwest Zone, where she reportedly oversaw 
five camps and prisons where nearly 50,000 people died.33 The charges against her include 
allegations of persecution on political grounds.34 Finally, the accused Yim Tith initially held 
the position of Secretary of Kirivong in the Southwest Zone, later becoming Deputy Secretary 
of the Northwest Zone, where he ‘had knowledge of, ordered and possibly directly participated 
in the torture and mutilation of prisoners’.35 The charges against him specifically include 
‘persecution against the so-called “17 April people”, “East Zone Evacuees”, Northwest Zone 
cadres, their families and subordinates, as well as the Khmer Krom and Vietnamese’.36 
Having outlined the factual background to the OCIJ’s query, we now turn to the law applicable 
at the time of the Khmer Rouge, in order to consider whether there is support for classifying 
crimes perpetrated against members of the armed forces as CAH. The following sections will 
consider the initial purpose behind the creation of the offence of CAH, before considering who 
                                                          
29 Mr Meas Muth charged in Case 003’, ECCC Website, www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/mr-meas-muth-charged-
case-003 (last accessed 24/06/2016). 
30 DeFalco, supra note 26, at 56. 
31 D.Gillison, ‘Extraordinary Injustice’, The Investigative Fund, 27 February 2012,  
www.theinvestigativefund.org/investigations/international/1612/extraordinary_injustice/ (last accessed 
07/06/2016). 
32 G. Wright, ‘Khmer Rouge Tribunal Charges Ta An with Genocide’ The Cambodia Daily, 15 March 2016. 
33 DeFalco, supra note 26, at 56. 
34 OCIJ Charges Im Chaem, supra note 24. 
35 J. Ferrie, ‘Khmer Rouge crimes in legal limbo’, The National, 24 July 2011.  
36 OCIJ Charges Yim Tih, supra note 24. 
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has been historically considered as constituting a victim of such crimes. Case law will be used 
to demonstrate that while CAH are often defined as being perpetrated against ‘civilians’, this 
has historically been interpreted broadly, allowing members of the armed forces to be victims 
of CAH perpetrated by their own state. 
3. Defining Crimes Against Humanity 
One of the primary purposes behind the conception of CAH was the protection of the human 
rights of all people within a state against widespread or systematic brutality committed by 
governments or other organizations.37 From the earliest attempts to define crime ‘against the 
laws of humanity’ following the First World War, through to the first codifications of CAH in 
the aftermath of the Second World War, it is evident that the legislation was designed to protect 
the human rights of all individuals.38 The concept of CAH was initially linked to international 
humanitarian law,39 an area of law that has historically drawn a distinction between civilians 
and combatants,40 but has also sought to ensure that individuals’ rights are protected during 
conflict. While the absolute protection of civilians during conflict must be balanced against 
military necessity – which may justify an otherwise unlawful act against the civilian population 
or a civilian object – an attempt to narrow ‘protection gaps’ is nonetheless evident in 
international humanitarian law.41 The Fourth Geneva Convention, for instance, focuses on the 
notion of protected persons, providing that:  
                                                          
37 International Co-Prosecutor Amicus (D306/2). N. Geras, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and 
Contemporary Application (2011), at 5-7, discusses the purposes behind the creation of CAH, including the 
primary purpose stated above, as well as such purposes as an  attempt to further the norms of warfare. 
38 Amicus, ibid. 
39 M. C. Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law (1999), at 44-60.  
40 Prosecutor v. Martic, ICTY, IT-95-11-A, Appeal Judgement, 8 October 2008, para 299. 
41 M.N. Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate 
Balance’ (2010) 50(4) Virginia Journal of International Law 795, at 798 
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Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any 
manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands 
of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.42 
While Article 4 provides that those afforded special protection under the other Geneva 
Conventions ‘shall not be considered as protected persons within the meaning of the present 
Convention’,43 the 1958 Commentary to the Geneva Conventions provides that ‘if, for some 
reason, prisoner of war status – to take one example – were denied to them, they would become 
protected persons’.44 As such, the concept of protected persons is residual in nature, 
demonstrating an intention to narrow the ‘protection gap’.  
Crimes against humanity emerged as a distinct category of crime in order to continue narrowing 
this protection gap, by protecting individuals from extreme harm that fell outside the definitions 
of war crimes and genocide.45 Specifically this category of crime can be used to try individual 
perpetrators for acts that: form part of a widespread or systematic attack on civilians both within 
or outside of an armed conflict; a state commits against its own people;46 and do not fit the 
technical and narrow requirements of genocide.47 CAH’s subsequent development has been 
influenced by international human rights law, which was designed, in part, to protect 
individuals in their relationships with states.48 While the definition of CAH has undergone 
many revisions, one of the foremost scholars in international criminal law, Cassese, suggests 
that definitions of CAH have the following common features:49  
                                                          
42 Article 4 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 
1949. 
43 Ibid. 
44 International Committee of the Red Cross, IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War: Commentary, 1958, 49. 
45 Bassiouni, supra note 39, at 61. 
46 Case No. 35 (The Justice Trial: Trial of Josef Altstötter and Others), UNWCC, 30 November 1947. 
47 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary (2013), 154. 
48 Ibid at 155.  
49 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2003), 64. 
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They are particularly odious offences [,] … they are not isolated or sporadic events, but 
are part of a governmental policy, or of a widespread or systematic practice of atrocities 
tolerated, condoned, or acquiesced in by a government or a de facto authority [,] … 
they are prohibited … regardless of whether they are perpetrated in time of war or peace 
[, and] … the victims may be civilians.  
When determining the applicability of the ‘crimes against humanity’ label to crimes 
perpetrated against Khmer Rouge cadres, it is the last element, defining ‘victimhood’ and 
‘civilians’, that is the most important, and which will be particularly considered in the 
following sections.  
3.1. The ‘Civilian’ Requirement 
Following the First World War, France, Britain, and Russia issued a Joint Declaration on 24 
May 1915, condemning ‘those new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilisation’, and 
pronouncing that the Allied governments, ‘will hold personally responsible these crimes all 
members of the Ottoman government and those of their agents who are implicated in such 
massacres’.50 The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 resulted in the establishment of a 
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties 
(Commission), whose report presented evidence of violations ‘against the law and customs of 
war and of the laws of humanity’.51 This report essentially proposed a new category of 
international crime ‘against the laws of humanity’ that could be applied to the attacks 
committed by Turkey on its own nationals in its own territories. Specifically, the Commission 
pointed to the mass killings of Armenians within the Ottoman Empire.52 In addition, the 
                                                          
50 Joint Declaration by France, Great Britain and Russia (24 May 1915, Paris, London & Petrograd), 
www.armenian-genocide.org/Affirmation.160/current_category.7/affirmation_detail.html (last accessed 
05/07/2015). 
51 L. Moir, ‘Crimes Against Humanity in Historical Perspective’, (2006) 3 New Zealand Yearbook of International 
Law 101, at 108. 
52 Cassese, supra note 49, at 64. 
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Commission explored the issue of the targeting of Armenians within the Ottoman Army, acts 
that included disarming Armenian soldiers, transferring them to labour brigades and subjecting 
many to eventual execution.53 Although the report was adopted unanimously, its 
recommendations to establish a further commission of inquiry as well as an international 
tribunal for war crimes were not carried out.54 Nonetheless, the report marked an important 
shift in the realm of international law: it solidified some of the foundational conceptions 
informing the creation of CAH; it highlighted the issue of defining victimhood, notably 
including members of the armed forces within this definition; and it served as a precedent for 
Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter.55 Furthermore, according to Wexler, it also implied that 
minority groups would have protection from their own government through international law, 
established individual criminal responsibility for violations of the ‘laws of humanity’, and 
recognised their independence from war crimes.56  Thus, an analysis of the very conception of 
CAH demonstrates that members of the armed forces were not excluded from constituting 
victims, and that members of minority groups were intended to receive protection against 
persecution by state actors.  
Subsequent definitions have varied in their approach towards the definition of CAH, and the 
inclusion or otherwise of a ‘civilian’ requirement. CAH first appeared in positive international 
law in 1945, when it was defined in Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter.57 The Nuremberg 
Charter58 and the subsequent Control Council Law No.10, 59 both define CAH as:  
                                                          
53 Amicus, supra note 37. 
54 Moir, supra note 51, at 109 
55 Amicus supra note 37; Moir, supra note 50, at 112. 
56 L. S. Wexler, ‘The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier 
to Barbie and Back Again’, (1994-1995) 32 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 289, at 298. 
57 Moir, supra note 51, at 112. 
58 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of 
the major war criminals of the European Axis, 8 August 1945, Art. 6(c). 
59 Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and against 
Humanity, 20 December 1945, Art. II. 
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murder, extermination enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape or 
other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population or persecution on 
political, racial or religious grounds, whether or not in violation of the domestic 
laws of the country where perpetrated.  
This definition gives rise to two categories of CAH, (i) acts against civilian populations, and 
(ii) persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds. Whilst the first category within this 
definition clearly contains reference only to ‘civilian’ populations, the second category 
contains no such exclusions. As explained by Cassese,  
since no mention is made of the possible victims of persecutions, or rather, as it is not 
specified that such persecutions should target ‘any civilian population’, the inference 
is warranted that not only any civilian group but also members of the armed forces may 
be the victims of this class of crimes. 60 
Support for a primary focus on persecution, rather than on the status of the victim, can be found 
in the work of jurists in the aftermath of the Second World War. For example, at the 1947 
Conference for the Unification of Penal Law, discussions around CAH focused predominantly 
on the existence of persecution. Its Resolution, drafted by some of the ‘best jurists in the 
world’,61 proposed a definition of CAH that removed the concept of ‘civilians’, and instead 
specified that: 
Any manslaughter, or act which can bring about death, committed in peace time as 
in war time, against individuals or groups of individuals, because of their race, 
                                                          
60 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd ed) (2008), 118. 
61 Joseph Y. Dautricourt, ‘Crime Against Humanity: European Views on Its Conception and Its Future’ (1949-
1950) 40(2) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 170, at 170. 
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nationality, religion or opinions, constitutes a crime against humanity and must be 
punished as murder.62 
While the Nuremberg Charter’s two-category definition continued to be utilised, for example 
in the International Law Commission’s (ILC) 1950 Nuremberg Principles and the 1968 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations,63 in 1954 the ILC released its 
Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, defining CAH as:  
Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or persecutions, 
committed against any civilian population on social, political, racial, religious or 
cultural grounds.64 
This definition is significantly closer to that used by the ECCC, and merges the two categories 
of CAH together, entrenching the civilian requirement into incidences of persecution. 
Certainly, the drafting process demonstrated a state practice to include a ‘civilian’ 
requirement.65 However, these sources illustrate that prior to 1975 differing approaches existed 
with regards to the inclusion of a civilian requirement in cases of persecution. Furthermore, 
the creation of these legal instruments included relatively little consideration of the definition 
of a ‘civilian’, or whether combatants could be victims.66 It is therefore worth considering how 
case law interpreted the ‘civilian’ requirement. 
 
 
                                                          
62 Resolution of the VIII Conference for the Unification of Penal Law, Brussels, 10th and 11th July, 1947. 
63 Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of 
the Tribunal. Adopted by the International Law Commission of the United Nations, 1950; Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations, Art. I (b). 
64 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1954, vol. E, pp. 150-152, document A/2673. 
65 E.g. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Sixth Session, in United Nations, Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission (1954) Vol.II at p.150. 
66 Report of the International Law Commission, UNGAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No 12, U.N.Doc. A/1316(1950). 
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4. Exploring the boundaries of ‘Civilian’ 
Definitions of ‘victims’ and ‘civilians’ were not the focus of many cases prior to 1975. Within 
its judgments, the Nuremberg Tribunal failed to make a distinction between the two categories 
of CAH and neglected to address the term ‘civilian population’; thus, failing to advance the 
conceptualisation of victimhood.67 Fortunately, subsequent trials have tackled these issues, in 
particular, two judgments delivered in the French courts. These judgments provide evidence in 
support of Cassese’s conclusion that in a situation where the state is engaging in inhumane acts 
and persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds, there is no requirement that the 
victims be civilians.68 This is important in the context of CAH before the ECCC, as Article 5 
of the ECCC Law defines CAH as crimes perpetrated on ‘national, political, ethnical, racial or 
religious grounds’.  
The French Cour de cassation issued one of the most important judgments on the definition of 
‘victims’ during the trial of Klaus Barbie. A major question raised during the Barbie Trial was 
‘whether this specific crime can be applied to any individual victim, or is it reserved only for 
those victims who are not fighting in the war?’69 Initially, the Investigating Judge and Grand 
Jury of the Appeals Court argued that the victim’s status as members of the Resistance 
prevented them from being victims of CAH. However, the Cour de cassation quashed this 
judgment, finding that ‘members of the resistance could be victims of crimes against humanity 
as long as the necessary intent for crimes against humanity was present’.70 Thus, the Barbie 
case reinforced the distinction between the two categories of CAH, reaffirming that when a 
                                                          
67 Wexler, supra note 56, at 310. 
68 Case No. 35, supra note 45; In re Pilz. Holland, District Court of The Hague (Special Criminal Chamber), 21 
December 1949; Special Court of Cassation, 5 July 1950. 
69 J-O. Viout, ‘The Klaus Barbie Trial and Crimes against Humanity’ (1999) 3 Hofstra Law & Policy Symposium 
155, at 163. 
70 Ibid. at 164. 
15 
 
state engages in persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds, there is no requirement 
that the victims be civilian. As stated by the Cour de cassation:  
it is the intention of the perpetrator of the crimes and not the quality or motives of 
the victims that determine the nature of the persecution committed … neither the 
victims’ motives nor their classification as combatants could exclude the guilty 
intent giving rise to Crimes against Humanity which shall be prosecuted… Crimes 
against Humanity include inhumane acts and persecutions committed in a 
systematic manner against people belonging to a particular race or religious 
community in the name of the State which is carrying out its policy of ideological 
hegemony … including inhumane acts and persecutions committed against 
adversaries of this policy, no matter what form this opposition may take.71 
The Cour de cassation followed this line of reasoning in relation to the crimes committed 
against members of the Resistance, including Lise Lesevre and Professor Gompel. The Court 
found that Barbie had arrested, tortured, and sent Lesevre to a concentration camp. It concluded 
that: 
when Barbie has tortured, or had others torture, members of the Resistance in order to 
obtain information of a military nature, he has committed war crimes, but when Barbie 
had Resistance members deported to concentration camps, where they were tortured 
and exterminated, he acted as a participant in the National Security policy of 
ideological hegemony.72  
Thus, the Court affirmed that an individual’s membership in an armed group was irrelevant, 
what was important was the establishment of the perpetrator’s intention while engaging in acts 
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of persecution. Gompel was another member of the Resistance who Barbie had arrested and 
tortured. The Court originally held that because it was ‘not clear whether Professor Gompel 
has been arrested in his capacity as a Jew or in his capacity as a member of the Resistance, 
Barbie would benefit from the doubt and could not be charged with this offense, as it had 
prescribed’.73 However, the Cour de cassation took the opposite approach, stating that: 
 in excluding from the definition of crimes against humanity the acts imputed to the 
defendant that could have been committed against persons belonging to or that could 
have been part of the Resistance, whereas the opinion states that these “atrocious” 
crimes, of which the persons who were systematically or collectively the victims, were 
presented, by those in whose name they were perpetrated, as being politically justified 
by the national-socialist [Nazi] ideology, and whereas neither the mental intent of the 
victims, nor the possibility that they were combatants, could exclude the existence, on 
the defendant’s part, of the mental intent required for the infraction pursued, the 
Indicting Chamber has misunderstood the scope and meaning of the law.74 
Thus, the Court emphasised the intent of the perpetrator, rather than the status of the victim. 
While the Touvier case did not delve into as much depth when considering the issue of 
victimhood, the Court did come to a similar conclusion. The Cour d’appel de Paris found that: 
Jews and members of the Resistance persecuted in a systematic manner in the name 
of a state practising a policy of ideological supremacy, the former by reason of their 
membership of a racial or religious community, the latter by reason of their 
opposition to that policy, can equally be the victims of crimes against humanity.75   
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It is clear from the Barbie and Touvier cases that members of the armed forces, including the 
resistance, were to be included within the second category of CAH. According to these 
judgments, the status of the victims as members of the armed forces was irrelevant, the 
intention of the perpetrator and the context of the crimes were what was important. This 
appears to be in keeping with the original spirit in which CAH were established: as a means of 
ensuring protection of the human rights of all people within a state against widespread or 
systematic brutality committed by governments or other organisations.76  
Thus, an analysis of the law and legal opinion in relation to CAH prior to the Khmer Rouge 
regime of 1975-1979 supports the conclusion that in a situation where the state is engaging in 
inhumane acts and persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds, there is no requirement 
that the victims be civilians.77 As concluded by Cassese: 
Plainly, in times of peace military personnel too may become the objects of crimes 
against humanity at the hands of their own authorities. By the same token, in times 
of armed hostilities, there is no longer any reason for excluding servicemen, 
whether or not hors de combat (wounded, sick, or prisoners of war), from 
protection against crimes against humanity (chiefly persecution), whether 
committed by their own authorities, by allied forces, or by the enemy.78 
As noted above, Article 5 of the ECCC law requires CAH to have been perpetrated on 
‘national, political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds’, thus incorporating an implied 
reference to persecution. Unlike the formulations used in these courts, Article 5 does not 
separate crimes against civilians and the crime of persecution. However, we argue that the 
above approach should nonetheless guide the ECCC in its application of Article 5; as we 
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explore below, the addition of the civilian requirement should not be used to limit the 
applicability of CAH through persecution. 
It is worth noting that post-Second World War jurisprudence also featured a liberal 
interpretation of the term ‘civilians’ outside the context of persecution.  For example, in the 
case of R. (StS 19/48),79 the Supreme Court for the British Occupied Zone found that 
denouncing a non-commissioned officer in uniform could constitute CAH, as long as it could 
be demonstrated that the agent’s intention was to hand over the victim to the ‘uncontrollable 
power structure of the party and State’, knowing that, as a consequence, the victim was likely 
to be caught up in an arbitrary and violent system.80 Similarly, in P. and others, five members 
of a Court Martial were found guilty of complicity in a CAH for their role in executing three 
German marines who tried to escape from Denmark following Germany’s partial capitulation. 
The Court noted that actions between soldiers could constitute CAH, if it could be shown that 
the ‘action at issue can belong to the criminal system and criminal tendency of the Nazi era’.81 
In the H. case, the same Court found that a judge who had sentenced to death two officers of 
the German Navy could be held guilty of CAH to the extent that his action was undertaken 
deliberately in connection with the Nazi system of violence and terror.82  
From this analysis, it can be seen that customary international law at the time of the Khmer 
Rouge crimes incorporated a broad conception of who could be a victim of a CAH. The status 
of victims has been repeatedly found to be irrelevant, where the crimes were perpetrated in the 
context of states practising hegemonic political ideologies enforced through arbitrary and 
violent systems. There is therefore a strong case in support of the International CIJ’s 
supposition that a regime which, during an armed conflict, tried to cleanse its own armed forces 
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of all soldiers holding a particular ethnicity or faith, would under international customary law 
be engaging in a variety of CAH, because the victims’ combatant quality merely because they 
are soldiers would be entirely irrelevant in this context.  
Such an approach is also in keeping with the spirit of international humanitarian law. As noted 
above, one of the goals of this area of law has historically been to protect those rendered 
vulnerable during conflict. For example, while Article 50 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I83 
excludes members of the armed forces from being considered a ‘civilian’,84 Commentary on 
the Protocols notes that: ‘In protecting civilians against the dangers of war, the important aspect 
is not so much their nationality as the inoffensive character of the persons to be spared and the 
situation in which they find themselves’.85 Thus, while international humanitarian law has 
traditionally explicitly excluded members of the armed forces from its definition of ‘civilian’, 
it nonetheless recognises the importance of protecting individuals who find themselves in a 
situation of vulnerability. The development of CAH reflects the desire to protect vulnerable 
individuals who fall outside the remit of international humanitarian law. Indeed, the need for 
the law to recognise and protect vulnerability is a theme that consistently runs through our 
analysis. 
The following section explores the boundaries of civilian in the jurisprudence of the ICTY, 
ICTY and ICC. Due to the principle of non-retroactivity, the jurisprudence of these 
contemporary courts have no direct applicability to the status of customary international law 
between 1975 and 1979. Furthermore, contemporary tribunals have adopted varying 
definitions of CAH, and Bassiouni has opined that the tribunals developed their specific 
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definitions to reflect their specific contexts and were not intended for future application.86 
Nonetheless, these tribunals have considered the appropriate definition of the term ‘civilian’, 
and have in some instances used similar formulations of CAH to that utilised by the ECCC. As 
such, they can provide guidance on possible interpretations of CAH, the term ‘civilian’, and 
the possibility of armed forces being victims of CAH perpetrated by State actors. It will be 
demonstrated below that while nothing in this jurisprudence explicitly excludes members of 
the armed forces from being victims of CAH, a more restrictive interpretation of ‘civilian’ has 
emerged, which the ECCC has the opportunity to counter in its own work. 
5. Crimes Against Humanity in Contemporary Tribunals  
The ECCC definition of CAH is an almost verbatim repetition of Article 3 of the Statute of the 
ICTR, which contains a list of crimes that constitute CAH when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, 
racial or religious grounds.87 A particularly significant development is that the two categories 
of CAH identified under customary international law – acts against a civilian population and 
persecution on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds – have been collapsed into 
one category under Article 3. Due to its similarities to the ECCC’s formulation, the ICTR’s 
jurisprudence is of particular interest as an example of how courts have interpreted such 
provisions, which will be returned to below. 
In contrast, the ICTY and ICC have abandoned the discriminatory element of CAH – although 
persecution is included as a specific underlying crime - while retaining the notion of ‘civilians’ 
as victims. Article 5 of the Statute of the ICTY contains a list of crimes that, when committed 
in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any 
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civilian population, constitute CAH.88 Ultimately, this definition is regressive in nature, as it 
revives the original ‘Nuremberg’ nexus with armed conflict.89 However, the court has 
subsequently found that ‘customary international law may not require a connection between 
CAH and any conflict at all’.90 Consequently, the ICTY has held that Article 5 only requires 
that the acts are committed within an armed conflict, for the purposes of jurisdiction, and that 
‘the nexus which is required is between the accused’s acts and the attack on the civilian 
population’.91 Article 7 of the Statute of the ICC provides an extended list of crimes that may 
constitute CAH when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.92 During the negotiations for the Rome 
Statute, the inclusion of a civilian requirement proved controversial with some delegations 
preferring the wording ‘any population’ as opposed to ‘any civilian population’. In the end, the 
latter term was agreed upon as it was held to be consistent with customary international law; 
however, those against such wording were comforted by the fact that case-law existed to 
support a flexible interpretation of the term ‘civilian’, such as the Barbie case discussed 
earlier.93 While the exclusion of a discriminatory element renders the jurisprudence of these 
courts less persuasive in the context of the ECCC, they still contain useful guidance on the 
interpretation of the term ‘civilian’. 
These contemporary formulations of CAH are a regression from customary international law 
and are troubling, as they potentially leave soldiers and combatants unprotected. Consequently, 
the question of how courts should interpret the phrase ‘any civilian population’ becomes of 
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significant practical importance. Contemporary tribunals have considered this question in two 
parts: firstly, which individuals fall within the definition of ‘civilian’ and, secondly, what are 
the necessary characteristics of the population under attack. 
5.1 From Civilian to Hors de Combat  
While the term ‘civilian’ is primarily understood as referring to non-combatants, case-law from 
the ICTR has adopted a broad interpretation of the term civilian, which incorporates hors de 
combat.94 In Akayesu it was held to include ‘people who are not taking any active part in the 
hostilities, including members of the armed forces who laid down their arms and those persons 
placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause.’95 Furthermore, the 
Kayishema case provided a negative definition of civilian in the context of relative peace: ‘all 
persons except those who have the duty to maintain public order and have the legitimate means 
to exercise force’.96 On the face of it, this latter interpretation could be viewed as regressive in 
nature as it excludes, for example, members of the police or peacekeeping forces as potential 
victims. However, the interpretation of civilian as including hors de combat enables these 
individuals to claim victim status. This was evidenced in the military cases; when 10 Belgian 
peacekeepers were beaten and executed by the Rwandan army after being captured, it was held 
that it did not matter that one of them had obtained a weapon to use in self-defence before they 
were killed. The fact of a weapon did not change their vulnerable status and the attack against 
them forming part of a larger CAH.97 Moreover, the peacekeepers were held to be protected 
persons because their ‘mandate “did not include combat”’, indicating that they ‘were disarmed 
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before they were killed’.98 Thus, the focus was on their heightened vulnerability rather than 
their formal status. We would argue that the ECCC should follow this approach: Khmer Rouge 
cadres subjected to purges would be in a position of heightened vulnerability, with their formal 
status having little relevance to their victimhood. Such an approach is also in keeping with that 
of customary international law post-Second World War.  
Early jurisprudence from the ICTY similarly recognised the need to adopt a ‘wide definition 
of civilian population’.99 In Kupreskic, the ICTY juxtaposed the protection afforded to civilians 
as opposed to combatants under Article 5 of its Statute: 
It would seem that a wide definition of “civilian” and “population” is intended. This is 
warranted first of all by the object and purpose of the general principles and rules of 
humanitarian law, in particular by the rules prohibiting crimes against humanity. The 
latter are intended to safeguard basic human values by banning atrocities directed 
against human dignity. One fails to see why only civilians and not also combatants  
should be protected  by  these rules  (in  particular  by  the  rule  prohibiting persecution), 
given that these rules may be held to possess a broader humanitarian scope and purpose 
than those prohibiting war crimes.100 
According to Ambos and Wirth, Kupreskic represents a human rights-based understanding of 
CAH, as ‘not only the human rights of civilians but also those of soldiers can be violated’.101 
Building on this expansive approach, Blaškić delimited two categories of people who could 
qualify as civilians for the purposes of CAH. The first category included ‘members of 
resistance movements and former combatants – regardless of whether they…wore uniform or 
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not – but who were no longer taking part in hostilities when the crimes were perpetrated 
because they had either left the army or were no longer bearing arms or…had been placed hors 
de combat…’. The second category was to be determined by the ‘specific situation of the victim 
the moment the crimes were committed, rather than his status’.102  
It is clear from the above analysis that there has been continued recognition within 
contemporary courts that soldiers, combatants and those who have the legitimate means to 
exercise force can be victims of CAH where they are placed hors de combat: effectively 
demobilized and in a state of vulnerability. From what we know of the Cambodian context, the 
cadres were detained in security centres, suggesting that they were disarmed; thus, they were 
hors de combat and qualify as ‘civilians’ for the purpose of establishing CAH, so long as the 
discriminatory motive required under Article 5 of the ECCC Statute is proven. Indeed, the 
Khmer Rouge based its purges on the ethnicity, political or religious background of the soldiers 
as well as their lack of ideological commitment. 
However, there has been a subsequent narrowing of the ICTY’s approach to the term ‘civilian’ 
and a growing consensus that the term should be defined as provided in Article 50 of Additional 
Protocol I, meaning that members of armed forces and other armed groups would be 
excluded.103 Moreover, it must be noted that the broad categorization of civilian put forward 
in Blaškić (see above) was subsequently overturned on Appeal. The Appeal Chamber held that 
members of the armed forces and members of organized resistance groups cannot claim civilian 
status and that the Trial Chamber had erred in holding the specific situation of the victim at the 
time of the crime was determinative of one’s status.104 In a further narrowing of the definition, 
the Mrkšić et al Appeal case held that the term civilian ‘does not include combatants or fighters 
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hors de combat’.105 The Chamber came to this conclusion despite acknowledging that it leaves 
a fundamental protection gap in the law:  
It is important to observe that failing to consider atrocities against fighters hors de 
combat as crimes against humanity does not mean that these acts will go unpunished. 
If committed in the context of an armed conflict, they are likely to qualify as war crimes, 
as will be the situation in the typical case before the ICTY. If committed in peacetime, 
they will be punishable under national law. There may perhaps be a “protection gap” in 
those situations, as crimes of this nature would fall outside the jurisdiction of 
international criminal courts and national authorities may not always be willing to 
prosecute.106 
This narrowing of approach can be linked to the fact that the definition of CAH under Article 
5 of the Statute of the ICTY requires that it take place within an armed conflict, and that the 
cases before the ICTY were concerned with the treatment of belligerent states’ citizens, 
whether civilians or armed troops. In the Martić Appeal case, the ICTY explained that it did 
not want to ‘blur the necessary distinction’ between civilians and the military, and between war 
crimes and CAH.107 
While the definition of CAH under the Statue of the ICC does not require the presence of an 
armed conflict and therefore applies in times of peace, the ICC has aligned itself with the 
narrow interpretation adopted at the ICTY.108 This narrow approach has also been supported 
by Bartels, who believes that an expansive definition of civilian results in ‘problematic rulings’ 
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that ‘qualify acts as crimes against humanity although they would be legitimate under IHL’.109 
Yet, our analysis has demonstrated that even humanitarian law recognises the need to consider 
the vulnerability of the individual as opposed to their formal status. Moreover, Bartels’ view 
should be contrasted with that of Ambos and Wirth who argue that, as CAH can be committed 
in times of war and times of peace, the term ‘civilian’ should be interpreted broadly ‘because 
it must cover all persons which are not protected by humanitarian law, especially in times of 
peace’.110 Ambos and Wirth endorse the original interpretation of civilian as set out in Blaškić, 
providing that ‘it meets the needs of comprehensive protection of human rights very well since 
everyone except an active combatant of a hostile armed force is in a “specific situation” 
requiring the protection of his or her human rights’.111  
In contrast to the ICTY Statute, there is no specific requirement within the ECCC’s Statute that 
CAH be committed in the context of an armed conflict. War crimes and CAH, as defined in 
the ECCC Statute, are distinct. CAH are widespread and systematic in nature, require no link 
to a conflict, can be committed against the state’s own citizens, and have discriminatory intent; 
whereas war crimes occur within the context of an armed conflict and typically involve the 
treatment of protected persons of the belligerent power. Furthermore, the factual context within 
which the ECCC operates, while involving an armed conflict, also involves crimes perpetrated 
by a state against its own nationals. Such victims would fall within the protection gap if too 
narrow an interpretation of CAH was pursued, as such crimes would not fall within the 
definition of war crimes. Thus, we would argue that the ECCC should avoid the trap of 
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widening the protection gap and narrowing the reach of CAH in order to retain a distinction 
with war crimes.  
The second part of the analysis adopted by contemporary tribunals explores the characteristics 
of the population under attack. The jurisprudence from all of the contemporary tribunals 
provide that the ‘targeted population must be of a predominantly civilian nature. The presence 
of certain non-civilians in their midst does not change the character of the population’.112 In 
Katanga, the ICC held that ‘the crime may be established even if the military operation also 
targeted a legitimate military objective. It is important, however, to establish that the primary 
object of the attack was the civilian population or individual civilians’.113 While one could 
interpret the requirement that civilians must be the primary object of attack as overly restrictive, 
an expansive approach towards the interpretation of the term civilian would minimize this risk. 
Indeed, in situations such as that before the ECCC, where a regime targets its own armed forces, 
the distinction between combatants and civilians becomes less relevant, as does the overall 
composition of the targeted population. Rather, as argued by Luban, it should be ‘the use of 
political and military power to assault rather than protect the well-being of those over whom 
the perpetrators exercise de facto authority’ that is the crux of CAH.114 Thus, a focus on the 
intent of the perpetrator is of greater significance than the formal status of those victimised.  
6. Conclusion and Recommendations 
This article considered the question of whether, under customary international law applicable 
between 1975 and 1979, an attack by a state or organisation against members of its own armed 
forces may amount to an attack directed against a civilian population, constituting a CAH under 
Article 5 of the ECCC Law. We considered this question in the context of specific allegations 
                                                          
112 Tadić, supra note 99, at para. 638; Akayesu, supra note 95, at para. 582, n. 146; The Prosecutor v. Bemba 
Gombo Trial Judgment, Case No. ICC-01/05 -01/08, T.Ch. III, 21 March 2016, para. 153. 
113 Katanga, supra note 108, at para. 802. 
114 D. Luban ‘A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity’ (2004) 29(1) Yale Journal of International Law 85, 101. 
28 
 
made against a number of individuals charged at the ECCC. We have argued that such an attack 
may constitute a CAH, demonstrating that customary international law applicable between 
1975 and 1979 supports this approach. 
We have demonstrated that CAH were initially designed to fill a protection gap left by war 
crimes and genocide, thereby ensuring protection of the human rights of all people within a 
state against widespread or systematic brutality committed by governments or other 
organizations. From the first attempts to define crime ‘against the laws of humanity’ following 
the First World War, through to the first codifications in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, it is evident that the intention was to protect the human rights of all individuals.115 It is 
therefore already evident that the spirit of CAH would allow for state attacks against their own 
armed forces to be CAH. Support for this view can also be found in post-World War Two case-
law. A complication arises, however, in that initial formulations of CAH were split into two 
categories: those involving persecution, and those involving attacks against civilians. Article 5 
of the ECCC Law contains implicit reference to persecution through its reference to ‘national, 
political, ethnical, racial or religious grounds’. Furthermore, within the charges made against 
the accused in Cases 003 and 004 are a number of allegations of persecution: including crimes 
perpetrated on political and religious grounds against Khmer Rouge cadres and their 
families;116 and ‘persecution against the so-called “17 April people”, “East Zone Evacuees”, 
Northwest Zone cadres, their families and subordinates, as well as the Khmer Krom and 
Vietnamese’.117 Thus, it would appear that the jurisprudence relating to the crime of 
persecution is of particular relevance, implying that there should be no civilian requirement at 
all. However, the wording of Article 5 includes specific reference to a civilian population, and 
does not distinguish between the two categories identified in customary international law. 
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Thus, the interpretation of ‘civilian’ remains a crucial element. While the ECCC found in its 
judgments in Cases 001 and 002/01 that a member of the armed forces could not be a civilian, 
even if hors de combat,118 we believe our analysis of the relevant law at the time demonstrates 
that this is the incorrect approach. 
In exploring the boundaries of the term ‘civilian’ in case law prior to 1975-1979, broad 
understandings of who may constitute a victim of CAH were evident in relation to both 
categories outlined above. In cases concerning persecution, such as Barbie119  and Touvier,120 
it was demonstrated that the status of the victims as members of the armed forces was 
irrelevant, and that it was the intention of the perpetrator and the context of the crimes that 
were central to establishing CAH. Further, the cases of R. (StS 19/48),121 P. and others,122 and 
H. case,123 demonstrated that even in the absence of persecution, CAH could be perpetrated 
against soldiers in the context of state policies of violence and terror. Thus, customary 
international law applicable from 1975-1979 provides a strong case for holding that the purges 
carried out by the Khmer Rouge against its own armed forces can qualify as an attack against 
a ‘civilian population’ for the purposes of establishing CAH. We would support the analysis of 
Cassese, and the jurists at the 1947 Conference for the Unification of Penal Law, who 
advocated for a focus on persecution, rather than the status of victims, as being the crux of the 
criminality of CAH.124 We acknowledged that international humanitarian law has traditionally 
excluded armed forces from the definition of ‘civilian’. However, we found that a broad 
definition of the term in the context of CAH was in keeping with international humanitarian 
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law norms, which have sought to narrow the protection gap and protect those of ‘inoffensive 
character’, a characteristic not unique to those who benefit from formal civilian status.  
We also looked for guidance within the Statutes and jurisprudence of contemporary courts, 
while acknowledging that these courts have not specifically addressed the question of whether 
attacks against armed forces can constitute an attack against a civilian population, and 
recognising their more limited relevance to the ECCC’s analysis. We found that contemporary 
formulations of CAH have been inconsistent. While the ICTY and ICC have removed the 
requirement of persecution from their definitions, the ICTR has also collapsed the two 
categories into one, transposing the civilian requirement onto crimes of persecution. This 
merger arguably widens the protection gap in a way that is counter to the spirit in which the 
offence was created, as it risks leaving soldiers and combatants without protection under the 
law of CAH. However, an expansive interpretation of ‘civilian’ can counter this, and the ICTR 
has shown a willingness to include hors de combat within the category of ‘civilian’ in the 
Akayesu125 case and the military cases. The ICTY has also occasionally adopted a broad 
interpretation, for example in the case of Blaškić.126 While this case was ultimately overruled 
on appeal, we have argued that the standard set in Blaškić is in keeping with a human rights-
based approach to CAH. The Khmer Rouge’s practice of purging appeared to involve arresting 
and sending to security centres those cadres who were deemed ‘undesirable’ whether due to 
their religion, ethnicity, or lack of ideological commitment. Such individuals would constitute 
hors de combat and therefore this jurisprudence legitimises the OCIJ recognising the purges of 
the Khmer Rouge cadres as CAH. 
Unfortunately, the ICTY has shown a recent tendency to adopt a more restrictive interpretation 
of ‘civilian’, due to concerns over the blurring of lines between CAH and war crimes. However, 
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we would agree with the statement of the ECCC International CIJ, who observed that ‘the 
entire distinction between combatants and civilians might only make sense if we are talking 
about combatants and civilians of the enemy population’.127 In the context of the ECCC, what 
has occurred is a widespread attack on a population with discriminatory intent, 128 perpetrated 
by state actors against their own armed forces. As observed by the International CIJ, when a 
regime seeks to cleanse its own armed forces of soldiers holding a particular ethnicity or faith, 
the victims’ combatant quality would be entirely irrelevant. 129 
The ECCC has an opportunity to provide clarity to a complex area of law, to contribute 
significantly to the development of international criminal law, and to counter the regression 
that has emerged in the contemporary jurisprudence. We suggest that the ECCC take a human 
rights approach, which recognizes vulnerability, rather than the official status of the victim, as 
being relevant in interpreting ‘civilian populations’ and gives priority to the intention of the 
perpetrator. Such an approach would narrow the protection gap, and ensure that widespread 
and systematic abuses of state power are appropriately criminalised as CAH. Criminalization 
of CAH arose to protect individuals left vulnerable to abuse by those in power.130 Symbolically, 
these crimes penalize acts that shock the conscience of humanity due to their flagrant disregard 
for human spirit, life, integrity and dignity.131  The OCIJ should adopt an interpretation of 
Article 5 that is in keeping with the overall purpose of international criminal law, international 
human rights law, and international humanitarian law, to protect the basic values of human 
dignity, regardless of the legal status of those entitled to such protection.132 As such, the breadth 
                                                          
127 Call for Submissions, supra note 3, at para. 5. 
128 Viout, supra note 69, at 164. 
129 Call for Submissions, supra note 3, at para. 5. 
130 Luban, supra note 114. 
131 H. Singh ‘Critique of the Mrkšić Trial Chamber (ICTY) Judgment: A Re-evaluation on Whether Soldiers Hors 
de Combat Are Entitled to Recognition as Victims of Crimes Against Humanity’ (2009) 8 The Law and Practice 
of International Courts and Tribunals 247-96. 
132 See Kupreškíc, supra note 100, at paras. 547–49; The Prosecutor v Jelisíc Trial Judgment, Case No. IT-95-10-
T, T.Ch., 14 December 1999, para. 54. 
32 
 
of the ‘civilian population’ requirement should be considered a lower threshold to establish 
when construed against other elements of the crime. 
 
 
 
